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legal implications. This article offers a critical examination of the metaphors we choose
to describe encryption technology and aims to uncover some of the normative and legal
implications of those choices. The article begins with a basic technical backgrounder and
reviews the main legal and policy problems raised by strong encryption. Then it explores
the relationship between metaphor and the law, demonstrating that legal metaphor may
be particularly determinative wherever the law seeks to integrate novel technologies into
old legal frameworks. The article establishes a loose framework for evaluating both the
technological accuracy and the legal implications of encryption metaphors used by courts
and lawmakers—from locked containers, car trunks, and combination safes to speech,
shredded letters, untranslatable books, and unsolvable puzzles. What is captured by each of
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THE METAPHORS WE USE to imagine, describe, and regulate new technologies

have profound legal implications. This article offers a critical examination of the
metaphors we choose to describe encryption technology in particular, and aims
to uncover some of the normative and legal implications of those choices.
Part I provides a basic description of encryption as a mathematical and
technical process. At the heart of this article is a question about what encryption
is to the law. It is therefore fundamental that readers have a shared understanding
of the basic scientific concepts at stake. This technical description will then serve
to illustrate the host of legal and political problems arising from encryption
technology, the most important of which are addressed in Part II. That section
also provides a brief history of various legislative and judicial responses to the
encryption ‘problem,’ mapping out some of the major challenges still faced by
jurists, policymakers, and activists. While this article draws largely upon common
law sources from the United States and Canada, metaphor provides a core form
of cognitive scaffolding across legal traditions. Part III explores the relationship
between metaphor and the law, demonstrating the ways in which it may shape,
distort, or transform the structure of legal reasoning. Part IV demonstrates that
the function served by legal metaphor is particularly determinative wherever
the law seeks to integrate novel technologies into old legal frameworks. Strong,
ubiquitous commercial encryption has created a range of legal problems for
which the appropriate metaphors remain unfixed. Part V establishes a loose
framework for thinking about how encryption has been described by courts and
lawmakers—and how it could be. What does it mean to describe the encrypted
machine as a locked container or building? As a combination safe? As a form of
speech? As an untranslatable library or an unsolvable puzzle? What is captured
by each of these cognitive models, and what is lost? This Part explores both the
technological accuracy and the legal implications of each choice. Finally, the
article offers a few concluding thoughts about the utility and risk of metaphor in
the law, reaffirming the need for a critical, transparent, and lucid appreciation of
language and the power it wields.

I. AN ENCRYPTION PRIMER
For computer scientists, the concepts described in this article are both obvious
and fundamental. The same cannot be said for the lawyers, politicians, and
judges who shape the law as it pertains to encryption technology—at least not
universally. An article that seeks to understand what encryption “is” to the law
(and what it ought to be) therefore requires a small detour to explain what
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encryption “is” in fact. Ludwig Wittgenstein has said that “[i]n mathematics,
everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning,” even in moments when “we
seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things. Even these words are
used to construct an algorithm.”1 Perhaps in law we struggle with an inverse kind
of problem: that everything is meaning and nothing is algorithm—not even the
algorithms themselves.
Wittgenstein cautioned against the tendency in philosophy to interfere
both in language and mathematics, arguing that it ought to seek out only
understanding, to “leave everything as it is.”2 Even if we accept that jurists (unlike
Wittgenstein’s philosopher) have the latitude to move beyond pure description,
they must nonetheless begin by reckoning with mathematical fact. Without a
functional understanding of the technology itself, it is impossible to appreciate
how the language of the law variously captures, clarifies, distorts, and obfuscates
the nature of the encrypted machine. To that end, this Part aims to summarize a
small number of basic mathematical concepts which inhabit the mind of every
cryptographer, asking the reader to adopt them as his or her own in order to
make better sense of the analysis set out in the article that follows.
Encryption is the process of using a cryptographic algorithm (a cipher) to
transform information (plaintext)—such as an ordinary email, text message,
or file—into an unintelligible format (ciphertext) using a secret (a key).
Decryption, by contrast, is the process of using that key to revert the ciphertext
back to its original form.3 In other words, encryption encodes a message such
that it can only be read by its intended recipient (i.e., whoever has the secret key).
The mechanism from which the encryption key is derived can take any number
of forms—for example, it might be a passphrase, numeric code, or biometric
data (like a fingerprint or a retinal scan). As a security tool, encryption is used to
maintain message confidentiality, to authenticate the identity of the sender, and
to preserve the integrity of the message.4
Cryptography has been used to conceal political and military secrets since
at least the time of Julius Caesar, who wrote to Marcus Cicero using a basic
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, Rush Rhees, ed, translated by Anthony Kenny
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) at 468 [emphasis in original].
Andrew W Moore, “Wittgenstein and Infinity” in Oskari Kuusela & Marie McGinn, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 105 at 114.
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, 2nd ed
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996) at 1 [Schneier, Applied Cryptography].
In other words, encryption is used to ensure that the message can only be read by those with
the key, to confirm that the sender is who she says she is, and to ensure that the message has
not been altered in transit.
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cipher “that shifts the alphabet three places to the right and wraps the last three
letters X, Y, Z back onto the first three letters” (this is called the “Caesar cipher”
or “Caesar shift”).5
JULIUS ————— MXOLXV
plaintext
ciphertext

E (M) = (M + 3) (modulo 26)

Cryptanalysis is the study of cryptographic systems in order to find weaknesses
in their design or implementation which would allow the analyst to derive a
plaintext message from its ciphertext counterpart without the key. For a simple
example, note that a “shift” cipher like the one above only has 26 possible keys
using a standard Latin alphabet. This makes finding the right key easy to guess
(even for a human) through exhaustive search (“brute force”). Even when these
kinds of substitution ciphers become more complex, they remain relatively trivial
to decrypt using statistical frequency analysis, because the ciphertext continues
to reveal the linguistic and structural properties of the original plaintext
message.6 Modern cryptographic tools use vastly more sophisticated encryption
algorithms, both in order to mitigate that risk and to increase the number of
possible keys.7 As a result, decryption becomes more difficult, time-intensive, and
computationally demanding for an adversary.
Note however that in order to remain secure, such systems (no matter how
complex the algorithm) require some additional mechanism to safely transmit
5.
6.
7.

Dennis Luciano & Gordon Prichett, “Cryptology: From Caesar Ciphers to Public-Key
Cryptosystems” (1987) 18:1 College Mathematics J 2 at 3.
Ibid at 6.
Conceptually, it may help jurists to understand this methodology by looking to the
result when taken to its logical conclusion in the form of the “one-time pad,” a form of
polyalphabetic cipher invented in 1917. The one-time pad uses a key consisting of randomly
selected numbers that is the same length as the plaintext message itself. The result is that
for any given one-time pad, it is “equiprobable that a plaintext character is represented by
any ciphertext character,” eliminating patterns that would otherwise betray the original
message (ibid at 7). See Dirk Rijmenants, “The Complete Guide to Secure Communications
with the One Time Pad Cipher” Cipher Machines and Cryptology (22 January 2016) at 2,
online: <users.telenet.be/d.rijmenants/papers/one_time_pad.pdf> (the ciphertext generated
is theoretically unbreakable and mathematically unsolvable without possession of the
key, “regardless [of ] any existing or future cryptanalytic attack or technology, infinite
computational power or infinite time”). However, one-time pads require the generation
and exchange of a new set of key characters for every message sent, making them highly
impractical for most purposes. One-time pads also require an additional mechanism for
secure transmission of the key, which is why spies were known to exchange them using
disposable or self-destructing vehicles, such as flammable booklets. See also Schneier, Applied
Cryptography, supra note 3 at 15-17.
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the key itself to the intended recipient of the message. This is the reason that
spies were historically known to exchange keys to encrypted messages using fake
walnut shells, obscure radio transmissions, false coins, and flammable booklets.8
In the 1970s, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and the development
of RSA9 sought to address this key distribution problem, marking the dawn of
public key cryptography. In brief, public key cryptosystems allow two parties to
establish a shared secret without prior knowledge of each other over a public
network.10 In such systems, a cryptographic algorithm is used to generate a pair
of two keys: a public key which can be used to encrypt messages for a specific
party, and a private key which that party can then use to decrypt messages which
have been encrypted with the corresponding public key. As an example, imagine
two political activists—Ameenah and Benjamin—who need to exchange email
correspondence but are concerned about the risk of government surveillance.
Using a public key encryption system like Pretty Good Privacy (PGP),11
Ameenah only needs to know Benjamin’s public key (which he can make freely
available on the Internet) in order to encrypt an email such that only Benjamin
will be able to read it. Upon receipt of Ameenah’s email, Benjamin can only
decrypt that message using the private key file (which he keeps secret) paired
with his public one. Benjamin is then able to respond securely to Ameenah by
using her public key to encrypt a message that only she can read. Of course,
in many systems this kind of exchange takes place without the awareness or active
participation of users themselves: public key cryptography underpins a vast range
of modern communications security systems—from PGP to the key exchange
and authentication mechanisms of Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Cryptography plays a role in almost every conceivable application of modern
electronic communications technology: it secures web traffic, maintains the
confidentiality of files on a network, and protects electronic banking systems, for
example. Encryption technology takes many forms, and is used both to secure
data against interception as it travels over a network (“in transit”) and from being
8.
9.

Rijmenants, supra note 7.
The Diffie-Hellman exchange was a secure public key exchange method first published in
1976, and RSA was one of the first public-key cryptosystems (and it continues to be widely
used). They originated from, respectively, Whitfield Diffie & Martin E Hellman, “New
Directions in Cryptography” (1976) 22:6 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 644;
Ron L Rivest, Adi Shamir & Leonard Adleman, “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures
and Public-Key Cryptosystems” (1978) 21:2 Communications of the ACM 120.
10. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, supra note 3 at 4.
11. See the description of Phil Zimmerman’s “Pretty Good Privacy” in Schneier, Applied
Cryptography, supra note 3 at 584-85.

Law, Metaphor, and the Encrypted Machine 445

compromised while stored (“at rest”) on physical device (like a USB drive, laptop,
or mobile device). Different legal and practical implications follow depending on
which party applies the encryption and controls the private key or the mechanism
(such as a passphrase) from which it is derived. Some service providers choose
to design communications systems so that they retain the ability to decrypt their
users’ data. For example, data transmitted between a user’s phone and a social
media company’s servers may be both encrypted in transit and encrypted at
rest on the company’s servers. But so long as the company retains the ability to
decrypt that information—for example, in order to conduct analytics, to provide
more personally targeted advertising, to otherwise monetize the data, or because
the firm is required to do so by law—the secrecy of the information continues
to depend, on some level, on choices made or risks faced by the intermediary.
By contrast, many communications systems are now designed such that only the
sender and the intended receiver are able to access the plaintext version of the
message, a model known as end-to-end encryption. As a result, when Ameenah
and Benjamin use an end-to-end messaging application like Signal,12 their
private keys never leave their respective devices. A message can be encrypted
for Benjamin on Ameenah’s phone, and decrypted by Benjamin on his phone,
but there is no third party—including Signal’s developers—with the power
to access that message.13 End-to-end encryption has become the standard for
other popular mobile messaging applications such as iMessage and WhatsApp,
preventing third parties—including law enforcement and intelligence agencies—
from intercepting users’ private communications.
While modern cryptographic systems have become increasingly sophisticated,
their security continues to rely on the same basic mathematical principle: the
ciphertext becomes exponentially more difficult to decrypt as the length of a key
increases.14 Cryptosystems are meant to be designed in conformity with what is
known as Kerckhoffs’ Principle, such that they remain secure even if everything
about how they work—except the private key—is publicly known and known
by the adversary.15 This is the case for all modern encryption systems: they are
secure because the number of possible keys is unfathomably large and almost
computationally impossible to guess—not because there is any particular secrecy
12. Signal, Open Whisper Systems, online: <signal.org>.
13. In fact, companies like Signal often go to great lengths to design systems such that they limit
the exposure of user data. See e.g. Letter from Brett Max Kaufman to Special Agent Tracy J
Minnich (14 July 2016) on Open Whisper Systems (Signal), online: <signal.org/bigbrother/
documents/2016-10-04-eastern-virginia-subpoena-response.pdf>.
14. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, supra note 3 at 352.
15. Auguste Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire” (1883) 9 J des Sciences Militaires 5 at 12.
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in their design. To provide a sense of scale, the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) encrypts data by applying a series of substitutions and permutations to
128-bit blocks of plaintext using 128, 192, or 256-bit keys.16 A 256-bit key has
approximately 1077 potential combinations, a number only slightly smaller
than the number of atoms in the observable universe. Even using a powerful
supercomputer, attempting to guess the key to an AES-encrypted message
through brute force would take in the order of millions of billions of years.17
As Bruce Schneier has explained, “there is an enormous inherent mathematical
advantage in encrypting versus trying to break encryption,” rendering defence “so
much easier than attack that attack is basically impossible.”18 This mathematical
truth is what makes encryption such an extraordinary problem for the law.

II. ENCRYPTION AND THE STATE
“Cryptography rearranges power,” explains Philip Rogaway, “it configures who
can do what, from what. This makes cryptography an inherently political tool.”19
As discussed in Part I, revealing the plaintext form of a properly encrypted
message, file, or device is a practical impossibility without the right secret key.
As a result, while the state can (and does) exploit other vulnerabilities in networks,
computers, and people, it cannot practically circumvent modern encryption
using brute force alone. In principle, properly implemented strong cryptography
therefore allows the possibility for information to exist entirely beyond the reach
of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Consequently, encryption raises certain philosophical problems: even in
liberal democracies, the idea of a space entirely beyond government control
sits poorly with courts and policymakers. This is in part because cryptography
is math, and is therefore functionally agnostic: it secures the information of
activists, lawyers, financial institutions, and politicians in precisely the same way
as it does for child predators and terrorists. In doing so, encryption frustrates
the work of law enforcement and national security agencies that seek to use
16. United States National Institute of Standards and Technology for Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 197, “Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)” (26 November 2001), online: <csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
17. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, supra note 3 at 151.
18. Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your
World (New York: WW Norton, 2015) at 344.
19. Phillip Rogaway, “The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work” (Essay delivered as the
IACR Distinguished Lecture at Asiacrypt, Auckland, New Zealand, 2 December 2015) at 1,
online: <web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/moral-fn.pdf> [emphasis omitted].
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private information stored on devices or communicated in transit as evidence
or intelligence. For example, law enforcement may face challenges in accessing
evidence stored on an encrypted hard drive, on the servers of an intermediary,
or in encrypted text messages between an accused person and a third party.
Encrypted voice calls between persons of interest may make a traditional wiretap
futile, and encrypted web traffic will prevent an individual’s online activities from
being monitored or analyzed. Courts and legislators have been (and will continue
to be) called upon to provide “solutions” to these problems, confronting complex
issues of constitutional law and human rights in the process.20
Over the last forty years, states worldwide have introduced a constellation
of legal and policy responses in response to the challenges raised by encryption
technology, including both legal measures and covert practices. These practices
include: (1) controlling and restricting the public use, distribution, and export
of encryption technology; (2) compelling, persuading, or enlisting commercial
actors, academics, and others in efforts to weaken consumer software, publicly
available encryption tools, and encryption standards in order to facilitate
government access to data, whether systematically or on a case-by-case basis;
(3) compelling service providers to surrender the unencrypted form of otherwise
encrypted information or devices, or to give up control of a secret key (or the
mechanism from which that key is derived, such as a password) in order to allow
government authorities to decrypt the data themselves; or (4) compelling or
requiring individuals to surrender the unencrypted form of otherwise encrypted
information or devices, or to give up control of a secret key (or the mechanism
from which that key is derived, such as a password) in order to allow government
authorities decrypt the data themselves.
Beginning in the 1970s, the emergence of public key cryptography represented
the first challenge to “government’s longstanding domestic monopoly on the use
of electronic ciphers and its ability to prevent encryption from spreading around

20. For a more detailed analysis of this history and these legal issues in Canada, see Lex
Gill, Tamir Israel & Christopher Parsons, “Shining a Light on the Encryption Debate:
A Canadian Field Guide” (May 2018) Joint Research Publication, The Citizen Lab
(University of Toronto) and the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic
(University of Ottawa), online <citizenlab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Shining-A-LightEncryption-CitLab-CIPPIC.pdf>.
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the world.”21 By the early 1990s, however, digital technology had become so
ubiquitous that legislators, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies began to
perceive the widespread use of cryptographic tools as a significant threat. This
anxiety resulted in a White House proposal for a device called the “Clipper
Chip”—the first public attempt to mandate the insertion of what is often referred
to as a government backdoor into the devices of ordinary consumers.22 The
Clipper Chip relied on a system of key escrow, wherein the government proposed
to securely store a copy of each chip’s unique key, and used a classified encryption
algorithm intended to allow the public some of the commercial benefits of
modern encryption while affording law enforcement and intelligence agencies
the ability to access information in plaintext form. The proposal raised a host of
privacy and civil liberties concerns, and involved serious vulnerabilities baked
into its design: the consensus among security researchers was that there was no
way to implement a key escrow system without fundamentally compromising
user security.23 The Clipper Chip was ultimately rejected following widespread
public mobilization, as were subsequent attempts to revive key escrow.24
During the same era, the United States government became increasingly
concerned that encryption technology would be used overseas in ways that
compromised American interests. To manage the spread of cryptographic tools,
“all products using encryption were controlled under the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and listed on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)”
until 1996.25 These controls limited the availability of high-quality cryptographic
tools outside the United States, and in some cases criminalized researchers and
computer scientists who ran afoul of export regulations (for example, by uploading
cryptographic algorithms to the Internet).26 This battle played out in a series
of court cases in which the courts found that the distribution of cryptographic

21. Danielle Kehl, Andi Wilson & Kevin Bankston, “Doomed to Repeat History?
Lessons from the Crypto Wars of the 1990s” (June 2015) Open Technology
Institute Cybersecurity Initiative at 3, online: New America <static.newamerica.org/
attachments/3407-doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/
Crypto%20Wars_ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf>.
22. Ibid at 5.
23. Ibid at 11; see also Hal Abelson et al, “The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted
Third-Party Encryption” (27 May 1997), online: Columbia University Academic Commons
<hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9130>.
24. Kehl, Wilson & Bankston, supra note 21 at 7-8.
25. Ibid at 12.
26. Ibid.
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source code was subject to First Amendment protection.27 Throughout the
late 1990s export restrictions were gradually relaxed, largely due to pressure
from industry actors frustrated by the need to create weakened, export-grade
versions of commercial software, as well as to concerns that the regulations would
ultimately compromise the ability of American technology firms to compete in
a global market.28 The last of the major restrictions were reversed by early 2000,
marking the end of what had come to be known as the “Crypto Wars.”29
However, the battle over the future of encryption technology was far from
over. Beginning in the 1990s, attempts to draft an international “Internet Bill
of Rights” have consistently recognized an explicit right to use encryption,30
which is curious if only because encryption is so explicitly teased out from other
rights it enables (such as freedom of expression, privacy, and security). In 2006
the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) wrote that “people
communicating on the Internet must have the right to use tools which encode
messages to ensure secure, private and anonymous communication,” and in
2014, a coalition based at the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
set forth that “everyone has the right to use encryption technology to ensure
secure, private and anonymous communication.”31 These declarations are but
one indication that encryption continues to occupy a central place in the minds
of those working toward human rights, including freedom of expression and
privacy, in the digital sphere. Indeed, in many countries, public use of encryption
products remains greatly restricted or simply banned outright. In places like
China, India, Senegal, Egypt, and Pakistan, access to encryption tools remains
highly controlled or even criminalized, and even where it is allowed, government

27. Annette Vee, “Text, Speech, Machine: Metaphors for Computer Code in the Law” (2012)
2 Computational Culture, online: <computationalculture.net/article/text-speech-machinemetaphors-for-computer-code-in-the-law>. See especially Bernstein v United States
Department of State, 922 F Supp 1426 (ND Cal 1996) [Bernstein].
28. Kehl, Wilson & Bankston, supra note 21 at 14.
29. Ibid at 17.
30. See Lex Gill, Dennis Redeker & Urs Gasser, “Towards Digital Constitutionalism? Mapping
Attempts to Craft an Internet Bill of Rights,” Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society
Research Publication No 2015-15 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 2015) at 2, online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=2687120>.
31. Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Internet Rights Charter (Johannesburg:
APC, 2006); The Internet Rights and Principles Coalition (IGF), Charter of Human Rights
and Principles for the Internet (United Nations: IGF, 2014).
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agencies nevertheless maintain “overall authority to review and approve all
standards, techniques, systems and equipment.”32
In Canada, the United States, and much of the west, a choice has generally
been made to avoid imposing legal obligations on service providers that would
require them to design weaknesses into their software that would facilitate
government access to encrypted data (i.e., “backdoors”). As a result, governments
have generally had to find ways to make individuals reveal encrypted data
themselves on a case-by-case basis—either by compelling surrender of their
private key or by compelling them to decrypt the data personally. In the United
Kingdom for example, since 2007 Part III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act (IPA) has given various actors (from judges to high-level police and border
authorities) both the power to compel decryption and to criminally charge
individuals for non-compliance.33 The IPA gives those actors authority to compel
decryption in three broad circumstances: “in the interests of national security, for
the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, or in the interests of the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom.”34
In the United States and Canada by contrast, no equivalent statutory power
to compel decryption exists. Instead, because decrypting a device usually involves
the surrender of a password or passphrase (which only exist in the defendant’s
mind), attempts to compel decryption have generally been found to engage
the defendant’s right against self-incrimination, with certain exceptions. In the
United States, Fifth Amendment protection arises in the case of (1) testimonial
disclosure which is (2) compelled and (3) which could result in criminal liability.35
While there is no US Supreme Court jurisprudence yet on this particular issue,
following a careful review of existing case law the Congressional Research Service
concluded that “there is a strong argument that the Fifth Amendment would bar
the government from compelling an individual to disclose his passcode to the
government.”36 What constitutes “testimonial disclosure” has invariably become
a problem of metaphor, however, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part V.

32. Article 19, Right to Online Anonymity: Policy Brief (London: Article 19, 2015) at 29-30,
online: <www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38006/Anonymity_and_encryption_
report_A5_final-web.pdf> [Article 19].
33. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), c 23, ss 49-56 [RIPA].
34. Ibid, s 32.
35. Brendan M Palfreyman, “Lessons from the British and American Approaches to Compelled
Decryption” (2009) 75:1 Brook L Rev 345 at 354.
36. United States Congressional Research Service, “Encryption: Select Legal Issues,” by Richard
M Thomson II & Chris Jaikaran, Report No 7-5700 (CRS, 3 March 2016) at 12.
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Canada’s position on the issue can be traced back as far as 1998, when John
Manley (then Minister of Industry) claimed that “warrants and assistance orders
also apply to situations where encryption is encountered,” though this position
seems to have been later abandoned and “is not supported by any case studies,
proposed or passed legislation, or case law in Canada.”37 The Supreme Court of
Canada has yet to address the problem directly, though there are a few criminal
cases in which the accused’s right to refuse provision of a password appears to have
been taken for granted. In R v Boudreau-Fontaine, the most relevant appellate
case to the compelled decryption issue in Canada, the Court of Appeal of Quebec
found that police who had ordered a man to enter his laptop password as part
of an investigation into the breach of his probation conditions violated his right
to silence, his “right to be presumed innocent, the right not to be conscripted
against oneself, and the protection against self-incrimination.”38 As in the
United States, the question of whether being forced to disclose a private key or
to decrypt a device would garner the same protection against self-incrimination
as traditional testimony under the Charter depends on whether a key can be
properly characterized as “testimonial” in nature.39 In the most thorough
Canadian article on the subject, Nicole Dalla Guarda has argued that it likely
would—and moreover that the centrality of the right against self-incrimination
to Canadian law makes it unlikely that compelled decryption, “either through
the conduct of state actors or through legislation, could ever be justified under
ss. 1 or 24(2) of the Charter.”40
Notably in R v Fearon—a case concerning the warrantless search of cell
phones incidental to arrest—the Supreme Court appeared to reject the idea
that whether a phone is password-protected should have a significant bearing
on its user’s expectation of privacy.41 While the problem goes beyond the scope
of this article, it is worth stating that digital technology raises a curious legal
question about how to characterize the relationship between the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure and the rights to silence and against
37. N Dalla Guarda, “Digital Encryption and the Freedom from Self-Incrimination:
Implications for the Future of Canadian Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions” (2014)
61:1 Crim LQ 119 at 121; Industry Canada, “Canada’s Cryptographic Policy: Speaking
Notes for the Honourable John Manley Minister of Industry to the National Press Club”
(1 October 1998), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/gv00119.html>.
38. R c Boudreau-Fontaine, 2010 QCCA 1108 at para 39, 93 WCB (2d) 47.
39. Guarda, supra note 37 at 124, 133.
40. Ibid at 137.
41. R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at para 53, [2014] 3 SCR 621 (demonstrating that because the
phone was not password-protected in this case, the issue remained unexplored).
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self-incrimination. The result is that it may not be immediately obvious how an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy over a device should alter the scope
of their rights as an accused person, if at all.42 In any case, it is sufficient to state
that the Canadian position on compelled decryption remains somewhat unfixed,
and the limited American jurisprudence has suggested a narrowing tendency.
Beyond the possibility of compelled decryption on a case-by-case basis,
technological change has increased the perceived urgency of the encryption
debate, and provoked a renewed calls in western countries for government
“backdoors” or “lawful access” schemes. Whereas in the past, the use of encryption
tended to require the intentional deployment of specialized software, large-scale
commercial implementation of strong cryptography has now become standard
practice in securing web traffic, instant messaging, and physical devices such as
mobile phones and hard drives. As a result, where law enforcement and other
state agencies had previously been able to access or intercept with relative ease
plaintext data and communications between parties (whether lawfully or not),
the widespread proliferation of strong encryption has made that task increasingly
difficult. Following the 2013 Snowden disclosures regarding the National Security
Agency (NSA)’s domestic electronic surveillance activities, many technology
companies doubled down on efforts to secure their products from eavesdroppers,
including both criminals and governments alike.
In response, a new government narrative has emerged which employs
the rhetorical shorthand of “Going Dark.”43 Its proponents argue that strong
encryption compromises both legitimate intelligence-gathering activities and law
enforcement’s ability to secure evidence in criminal investigations. Others have
sought to reassure political leadership regarding the risk of cold cases, claiming
that—to the contrary—we now live in a “golden age of surveillance.”44 Peter Swire
42. See the discussion on the inverse question in R v Jones, 2017 SCC 60 at paras 16-34,
[2017] 2 SCR 696.
43. See Valeria Caproni, “Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies” (Statement before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 17 February 2011), online: <archives.
fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-ofnew-technologies>.
44. Matt Olsen, Bruce Schneier & Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the
“Going Dark” Debate (Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard University,
2016) at 9-15, online: <cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_
Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf>; Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, “Going Dark”
Versus a “Golden Age of Surveillance” (Stanford Center for Democracy & Technology,
2011), online: <web.archive.org/web/20120108160041/https://www.cdt.org/
blogs/2811going-dark-versus-golden-age-surveillance>.
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has argued that even where encryption has resulted in a loss of access to specific
information in specific contexts, those losses are more than offset by massive
gains in the form of new material never before available to law enforcement.45
Rogaway has described the “Going Dark” narrative as “a brilliant discourse
of fear: fear of crime; fear of losing our parents’ protection; even fear of the
dark,” and has advanced a competing set of propositions rooted in a surveillance
studies framework.46
Nevertheless, recent technological developments emerging alongside this
narrative have reignited calls for encryption backdoors from major political
figures in the United States, including one in the form of an ill-fated legislative
proposal from US Senators Burr and Feinstein.47 The legal dispute concerning a
court’s ability to compel Apple (under the All Writs Act) to assist in the decryption
of a device in the FBI’s possession48 was an attempt to circumvent encryption
through judicial means instead.49 Intelligence agencies in the United States and the
United Kingdom have also covertly sought to insert backdoors into commercial
encryption software, and have lobbied bodies such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to introduce weak links into public encryption
standards50 (Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has
assisted in similar efforts).51In Canada, the federal government conducted two
major public consultations in the fall of 2016, one on cybersecurity and another
45. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 44 at 4.
46. Rogaway, supra note 19 at 26.
47. Dianne Feinstein, “Intelligence Committee Leaders Release Discussion Draft of
Encryption Bill” (13 April 2016), online: <www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
press-releases?ID=EA927EA1-E098-4E62-8E61-DF55CBAC1649>.
48. In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
2016 US Lexis 20543 (CD Cal).
49. For a thorough legal analysis of both of these developments, see Thomson &
Jaikaran, supra note 36.
50. Association for Progressive Communications, “The right to freedom of expression and
the use of encryption and anonymity in digital communications” (2015) Submission
to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression at 11, online: <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/
AssociationForProgressiveCommunication.pdf>; James Ball, Julian Borger & Glenn
Greenwald, “Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security,”
The Guardian (6 September 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/
nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>.
51. See Christopher Parsons & Tamir Israel, “Canada’s Quiet History of Weakening
Communications Encryption,” Telecom Transparency Project and Canadian Internet
Policy and Public Interest Clinic (7 August 2015), online: <www.telecomtransparency.org/
canadas-quiet-history-of-weakening-communications-encryption>.
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on national security. The former identified encryption as a major challenge facing
law enforcement,52 and the latter, while billed as an attempt to reform some
of the more controversial aspects of the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015 (former Bill
C-51), dedicated an entire section of its accompanying background paper to the
perceived need for new lawful access powers, including the ability to circumvent
encryption. While the paper appeared to acknowledge that neither the power
to compel an individual nor an intermediary to decrypt data currently exists in
Canadian law, it failed to illuminate the government’s perspective vis-à-vis the
potential Charter issues such powers could raise.53 In short, from recent legislative
proposals in the United States to the ongoing national security consultation in
Canada, any potential “right” to encryption is far from won—and in that battle,
metaphor remains a persuasive weapon.

III. METAPHOR AND THE LAW
There is a rich body of literature examining the relationship between metaphor
and cognition, much of which finds its intellectual roots in George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson’s seminal work Metaphors We Live By. Lakoff and Johnson argued
that metaphors go beyond mere aesthetic, idiomatic, or descriptive tools, and
that they “have the power to define reality.”54 Metaphors simultaneously shape
and reproduce the ways in which we understand the world around us, and guide
our ability to navigate shared meaning within it. They create cognitive bridges
between disparate subjects, mapping existing knowledge about a familiar and
concrete source domain onto unfamiliar, abstract, or novel concepts.55 This
unconscious capacity to transpose old cognitive models onto new subjects is

52. Public Safety Canada, “Security and Prosperity in the Digital Age: Consulting on Canada’s
Approach to Cyber Security,” Consultation Workbook (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada,
2016), online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-scrty-prsprty/index-en.aspx>.
53. Public Safety Canada, “Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper,”
Background Document (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016) at 55, online: <www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-scrt-grn-ppr-2016-bckgrndr/ntnl-scrt-grn-ppr-2016bckgrndr-en.pdf>.
54. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003) at 157.
55. Cornelius Puschmann & Jean Burgess, “Metaphors of Big Data” (2014) 8 Intl J
Comm 1690 at 1696.
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a fundamental component of human reasoning; cognitive scientist Douglas
Hofstadter has called analogy “the very blue that fills the whole sky of cognition.” 56
Yet the metaphors we use in law are far from neutral. To the contrary, they
are emotionally and ideologically loaded devices with extraordinary normative
force, with the power to “help the imaginary become real or true.”57 The
strategic deployment of a conceptual metaphor may subtly move the goalposts
of a given argument, or it may change the game entirely, by obfuscating certain
characteristics and emphasizing others.58 In the words of Sara Watson, metaphors
“prime us to take for granted the ways we think about things,” allowing us to alter
the terms of a debate and rewrite the rules of political possibility.59 Metaphors
reconfigure meaning.
There is perhaps no context where this is more apparent than in the language
of the law. In Legal Fictions, Lon Fuller famously wrote that “metaphor is the
traditional device of persuasion,” and that in its absence, the law’s “power to
convince and convert” is fatally compromised.60 Legal reasoning works explicitly
by adapting old principles to novel facts: it operates through analogy, by way of
precedent. The law is also highly conceptual, with an internal logic that tends to
divorce words from their ordinary meanings, elevating them to abstract and even
metaphysical categories. These categories have boundaries, but those are neither
immediately apparent from the view of common sense nor fixed across time. Law
needs metaphor, because everything new is folded into the law by reference to
that which came before.
One type of “legal fiction” described by Fuller are those rhetorical devices
that we know to be “false statements,” but which are nevertheless “recognized as
having utility.”61 We adopt these falsehoods because they are expedient, provide
some functional benefit, or serve to preserve the internal coherence of the law. For
example, whether in the common or civil law tradition, one of the most powerful
56. Douglas R Hofstadter, “Epilogue: Analogy as the Core of Cognition” in Dedre Gentner,
Keith J Holyoak & Boicho N Kokinov, eds, The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive
Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) 499 at 499, quoted in Kailash Awati & Simon
Buckingham Shum, “Big Data Metaphors We Live By,” Medium (14 May 2015), online:
<medium.com/@kailashawati/big-data-metaphors-we-live-by-98d3fa44ebf8#.jkzvkjuh5>.
57. Sally Wyatt, “Danger! Metaphors at Work in Economics, Geophysiology, and the Internet”
(2004) 29:2 Sci Tech & Human Values 242 at 244.
58. Jonas Ebbesson, “Law, Power and Language: Beware of Metaphors” (2008) 53 Scandinavian
Stud L 259 at 260.
59. Sara M Watson, “Data is the New ‘___’,” Dis Magazine (2018), online: <dismagazine.com/
discussion/73298/sara-m-watson-metaphors-of-big-data>.
60. Lon L Fuller, “Legal Fictions” (1930) 25:4 Ill L Rev 363, 513 & 877 at 380.
61. Ibid at 369.

456

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

legal categories we have is that of personhood, to which the law has decided
certain rights and obligations may attach that do not attach to non-persons.
The construct of legal personhood is what allows us to accept that a corporate
entity ‘is’ a person for the law’s purposes, and by extension to accept that it has
special characteristics, such as the ability to make legally recognizable decisions,
to own and owe property, and to exercise certain rights.62 Yet we know that the
boundaries for inclusion in the legal category of ‘personhood’ are neither fixed
nor rooted in some kind of objective external reality. Battles over the abolition of
slavery and toward women’s suffrage have often been framed as exercises toward
a redefinition of ‘personhood’ in the law. Legal questions regarding the precise
moment a fetus becomes a “person” or whether corporate “persons” have the
same rights (such as political speech) as flesh-and-blood persons are similarly
illustrative. Metaphors are therefore instrumental in negotiating the boundary
points of legal category, and in so doing they both reconfigure and distort
relationships, rights, obligations, and identities.
The metaphors chosen by a court or legislature will effectively determine the
validity of certain arguments, delimit the boundaries of acceptable debate, and
reshape what we understand to be both “logical” and legal in a given situation.
Yet there is also a risk that over time the fact that a term is metaphor at all
becomes less apparent, allowing a concept to gradually shift from intellectual
shorthand to established truth. As Stefan Larsson writes,
When the metaphors are not perceived as metaphors, the conceptions behind will
be perceived as the only possible alternative for the purpose of a given regulation.
Any attempted revisionary arguments will then be framed within the prevailing
conception, no matter what arguments are produced. …. This means that legal
decisions, as well as legislation, are framed and conceptualized in a particular way
without us even seeing alternative frames or conceptualizations.63

In other words, the more entrenched a metaphor is, the more difficult its
underlying assumptions are to challenge or uproot. As Fuller wrote, the mind is
willing to go to great lengths “to preserve a comforting and persuasive analogy.”64

62. Ebbesson, supra note 58 at 262.
63. Stefan Larsson, “Metaphors, Law and Digital Phenomena: The Swedish Pirate Bay Court
Case” (2013) 21:4 Intl JL & IT 354 at 366 [Larsson, “Pirate Bay”].
64. Fuller, supra note 60 at 382.

Law, Metaphor, and the Encrypted Machine 457

IV. METAPHOR AND TECHNOLOGY
Metaphor plays a special role for the law wherever technology is concerned, for
at least two reasons. The first is that the pace of legal change lags far behind that
at which technology develops, and as such both courts and policymakers have
little choice but to adopt a reactive stance. In this way, metaphor provides a
critical shorthand, narrowing the gap between the world in which we live in and
the world for which the law was written. “The most typical way this happens,”
explain Tim Hwang and Karen Levy, “is that judges and regulators think about
whether a new, unregulated technology is sufficiently like an existing thing
that we already have rules about,” and then transpose the existing conceptual
framework onto the unregulated phenomenon.65 In other words, metaphor offers
a powerful conceptual “bridge” to transition between old and new in the law.66
The second reason for the special role of legal metaphor where new
technology is concerned is the fact that, as Judith Donath explains, “information
is fairly formless”—and as such, aspects of the digital environment may demand
a greater degree of metaphor than more material legal subjects.67 Larsson explains
how those formless technological experiences are translated into a materially
recognizable cognitive object using the term skeumorph (the “reuse of old
concepts for new phenomena”), using words and iconography that bind physical
letters to email, film photography to pixelated imagery, and so on.68 When the
law is faced with a problem that has a complex technical dimension, Larsson
explains that we are often faced with countless “skeumorphic” terms. He provides
the example of copyright litigation over The Pirate Bay, a website which “is found
in a ‘domain’ name, relying on ‘torrents’ to be found by a search ‘engine,’ taking
place in a ‘swarm’ and has nowadays moved into using ‘magnet’ ‘links.’”69 The
formless quality of the digital space means that “we are inevitably surrendering
to a conceptual reuse that is massive.”70 As a result, communicating the salient
aspects of a given technical reality to a courtroom or legislature may become an
65. Tim Hwang & Karen Levy, “‘The Cloud’ and Other Dangerous Metaphors,” The
Atlantic (20 January 2015), online: <www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/01/
the-cloud-and-other-dangerous-metaphors/384518/>.
66. Stefan Larsson, Metaphors and Norms: Understanding Copyright Law in a Digital Society, vol
36 (Lund: Lund University Press, 2011) at 101 [Larsson, “Metaphors and Norms”].
67. Josh Dzieza, “A History of Metaphors for the Internet,” The Verge (20 August 2014), online:
<www.theverge.com/2014/8/20/6046003/a-history-of-metaphors-for-the-internet>.
68. Larsson, “Pirate Bay,” supra note 63 at 355, 362.
69. Ibid at 363.
70. Ibid.
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act of double or even triple translation. Metaphor, while imperfect, provides a
common language.
Some would argue that the whole history of technology law is a history
of metaphor. After all, the conceptual infrastructure of North American
telecommunications law has its roots in legal principles that were drawn by analogy
from railway regulation and interstate commerce—ideas which themselves
originated in even earlier technologies and earlier analogies.71 Harmeet Sawhney,
Venkata Ratnadeep Suri, and Hyangsun Lee explain how the same framework
captured by the US Interstate Commerce Act was applied for all subsequent “point
to point technologies” involving the flow of materials and information, including
“petroleum pipelines, trucking, civil aviation, and telecommunications”—
breaking down only with the advent of broadcast media.72 The way they describe
this process over time is highly illustrative:
In the first-order stretching somewhat forced connections are made between
technologies. For instance, radio was linked to railroads via the telegraph and
telephone connections. In other words, it would have been difficult to establish
a connection between railroads and radio because there is little similarity between
them. The telegraph and telephone allowed for the establishment of this connection
because they were similar to railroads and also to radio but in different ways. The
similarities between railroads and telegraph and telephone networks are rather
immediate because they all are composed of nodes and links. On the other hand,
the similarities between telegraph and telephone networks and radio rest on the fact
they are electronic means of communication. The telegraph and telephone served as
intermediaries in linking railroads to radio. This stretched framework functioned as
long the new technology was employed in ways that mimicked the old one.73

There are countless instances where metaphor has shaped the law’s
understanding of a new technology, and the political implications of those
choices have been profound—particularly since the advent of the Internet.
The term “cyberspace” itself is deeply metaphorical, and was originally coined
by William Gibson in a work of science fiction (he called it “a consensual
hallucination”).74 Cyberspace invokes a shared virtual geography, a dimension of
spatiality, of place. But if what happens on the Internet occurs within a discrete
71. Harmeet Sawhney, Venkata Ratnadeep Suri & Hyangsun Lee, “New Technologies and the
Law: Precedents via Metaphors” (2010) 2:3 Eur J Leg Stud 38.
72. Ibid at 39.
73. Ibid at 47.
74. William Gibson, Neuromancer (London: Harper Collins, 1984). See also Mark Graham,
“Geography/Internet: Ethereal Alternate Dimensions of Cyberspace or Grounded
Augmented Realities?” (2013) 179:2 Geographical J 177 at 180.
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“place,” what kind of place is it? What are its topological features? Who belongs
there, who controls it, and where are its borders?75 Mark Graham has explained
cyberspace as being “conceived of as both an ethereal alternate dimension which
is simultaneously infinite and everywhere … and as fixed in a distinct location,
albeit a non-physical one.”76 Others have declared that the image of a ‘universal’
cyberspace is a falsehood entirely, and that the Internet, unevenly distributed itself,
simply reflects and reinforces existing global power relations.77 Nevertheless, the
metaphor is persistent, and its assumptions are apparent through decades of legal
debate related to the exercise of jurisdiction on the Internet—a debate which
arguably remains utterly unresolved in certain fundamental ways.
And if ‘cyberspace’ was the dominant metaphor developed and imagined
by 1990s cyberpunks, its chief competitor is surely the “information
superhighway”—a phrase (coined in the 1970s by Al Gore) which had a pervasive
impact on early government forays into Internet regulation. In her own discussion
of technological metaphor, Sally Wyatt draws her readers’ attention to an article
by Virginia Postrel published in a 1998 issue of Wired to illustrate the point.78
In that piece, Postrel criticizes infrastructural metaphors like the “information
superhighway” and “bridge[s] to the future,” arguing that they embed a specific
ideological agenda: that “the future must be brought under control, managed,
and planned … It represents technocracy, the rule of experts.”79 The debate over
net neutrality in the mid-2000s has often been retold by scholars as a similar
conflict of metaphor, one perhaps most famous for the comic failure of Senator
Ted Stevens’s claim that the Internet was just “a series of tubes.”80 While that
analogy failed to take hold, Al Gore’s “superhighway” was subject to a powerful
extension by Tim Wu, who first developed the principle of network neutrality by

75. John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (1996), online:
<www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>. Arguably those are the questions John Perry
Barlow sought to answer when he wrote: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary
giants of flesh and steel ... You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we
gather” (ibid).
76. Graham, supra note 74 at 180.
77. Ibid at 180.
78. Wyatt, supra note 57 at 251. See especially Virginia Postrel, “Technocracy R.I.P.,” Wired (1
January 1998), online: <www.wired.com/1998/01/postrel>.
79. Postrel, supra note 78.
80. “Your Own Personal Internet,” Wired (30 June 2006), online: <www.wired.com/2006/06/
your-own-person>; Ed Felten, “Taking Stevens Seriously” (17 July 2006), Freedom to Tinker
(blog), online: <freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/taking-stevens-seriously>.
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arguing against a system that would allow “fast lanes” and slow ones.81 The net
neutrality principle—and its corresponding metaphor of the Internet as a kind of
public infrastructure—has been an important bulwark against corporate control
of online expression, and an instrumental guarantor of the right to receive and
impart information online.82
The last twenty years of digital copyright law have been similarly coloured
by metaphor, where analogies to print and physical media remain stubbornly
dominant despite a legal context fundamentally transformed by technology.83
For example, The Pirate Bay has been subject to a great deal of litigation and
as a consequence, a vast barrage of metaphors that aim to describe the website’s
function.84 They have included terms like ‘platform,’ ‘search engine,’ ‘bulletin
board,’ and ‘assemblage’—distinct categories of Internet service subject to
different kinds of treatment by the law. For example, the label of ‘platform’
strategically folds The Pirate Bay into an area of law that is generally reluctant to
assign liability to intermediaries and service providers, whereas other terms (like
‘publisher’) would tend to increase the website’s perceived involvement in the
copyright infringing activities of its users.85 In each of these instances, we see new
ways in which metaphors “are instructive not for their realism, but for the way
they direct our focus to certain social and political phenomena.”86
Computer code itself is subject to shifting and transient conceptual
metaphors which are both dependent on context and ideologically loaded.
Annette Vee, for example, has analyzed the legal treatment of code in the
United States by grouping it into the three interrelated categories of text,
speech, and machine —which together, she argues, form “a set of ontologies
for code.”87 She demonstrates that in the context of copyright law, computer
81. Tim Wu, “Why You Should Care About Network Neutrality,” Slate (1 May 2006), online:
<www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2006/05/why_you_should_care_about_
network_neutrality.html>.
82. See e.g. Federal Communications Commission, Press Release, “Chairman Pai Circulates
Draft Order to Restore Internet Freedom and Eliminate Heavy-Handed Internet
Regulations” (21 November 2017), online: <apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-347868A1.pdf> (in the United States, where the current administration has moved to
repeal net neutrality rules, it has positioned itself in opposition to “heavy-handed” Internet
regulation, “utility-style regulations,” and “micromanaging the Internet” in a similar vein).
83. Larsson, “Pirate Bay,” supra note 63 at 377.
84. Ibid at 368-372.
85. Ibid.
86. Daniel J Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (New York:
New York University Press, 2004) at 28.
87. Vee, supra note 27 at 1.

Law, Metaphor, and the Encrypted Machine 461

code’s textual and literary dimensions are emphasized—whereas in the realm
of patent theory, software’s “functionality” and its machine-like qualities are
foregrounded. Similarly, where the US government has sought to censor or
criminalize code, its expressive elements have been defensively invoked to secure
its constitutional protection under the First Amendment. Yet the law struggles
to untangle each of these distinct stories from the other, particularly because
separating the “the expressive from the functional,” or “speech” from “conduct”
is often impossible in computing.88 Vee illustrates this element by pointing to
the legal battle over a piece of software called DeCSS, which was popularized
to circumvent restrictive digital rights management (DRM) technology. While
hackers and activists reproduced the code in the form of haikus and artwork to
emphasize its literary dimensions and strengthen First Amendment arguments,
the entertainment lobby denounced it as a “digital crowbar.”89 Vee captures an
important feature of legal metaphor in her analysis when she explains that “each
legal metaphor for code offers a different paradigm for where code can go, what
it can do, and who is allowed to write and circulate it.”90 She recognized that a
metaphor, even once entrenched, remains context-dependent: a technical term
may have entirely different semantic implications from one area of the law to
another. Indeed, what computer code ‘is’ to the law remains in flux—a point
comically illustrated by Jonathan Schwartz, one of Google’s key witnesses in the
intellectual property case Oracle v Google, who desperately tried to explain an
Application Programming Interface (API) to a judge as though it were as an item
on a breakfast menu in 2016.91
‘The cloud’ is perhaps one of the most frequently discussed technological
metaphors, both due to its conceptual ubiquity and because of the commercial,
political, and legal implications that flow from its popular adoption. However,
it has also been subject to sustained criticism for its ability to obscure
the technological infrastructure to which it refers, distorting the reader’s
understanding of data’s physicality and locality. As the now-trite saying goes, there
is no “cloud” after all, just someone else’s computer—or perhaps more accurately,
just someone else’s “millions of hard drives, servers, routers, fiber-optic cables,

88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid at 4.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Sarah Jeong, “In Oracle v. Google, a Nerd Subculture Is on Trial,” Motherboard (Vice) (12
May 2016), online: <motherboard.vice.com/read/in-google-v-oracle-the-nerds-are-gettingowned>. See Oracle v Google, 750 F (3d) 1339 (Fed Cir 2014).
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and networks.”92 Yet ‘the cloud’ imposes the model of a “single, virtual object,”93
one which is “weightless and intentionally vague”94 and that we understand to be
“just there, atmospheric and part of the environment.”95 The metaphor hides the
vast physical, electrical, and computational infrastructure housed in data centres
overseas, just as it negates “the infrastructure of labour” enabling the existence
of these digital networks.96 Tung-Hui Hu has described the cloud as “a cultural
fantasy of participation and security” which confuses and distorts traditional
notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction and which “hides its physical location
by design.”97 At the same time, he argues that because ‘the cloud’ as a metaphor
obscures relationships of power, it lends itself to a covert resurgence of sovereign
authority: “the cloud grafts control onto an older structure of sovereign power,
much as fiber-optic networks are layered or grafted onto older networks.”98
Intuitively, the metaphor also transforms how we understand the individual:
once information has been surrendered to ‘the cloud,’ there is a sense that it has
become depersonalized, disembodied, harder to locate—it becomes somewhere
else and someone else’s. From distorting property law constructions of ownership
and control, to reconfiguring legal tests for jurisdiction, this metaphor has
legal implications.
Even beyond ‘the cloud,’ the world of digital metaphor is rife with references
to the natural form—from bugs and viruses to webs and mice.99 The language
we have adopted to understand data seems particularly prone to these kinds of
analogies. “Big data” in particular often takes the form of an unstoppable natural
force: courts and the popular press alike adopt the language of data “torrents,”
“oceans” “deluges” “tsunamis” and “waves.”100 In those moments where the party
holding the data fails to maintain control of it, we even refer to it as a ‘spill’ or
a ‘leak.’ This metaphor, that “big data is a force of nature to be controlled,”101
is meant to emphasize the enormous volume and tremendous analytical power
of the information at stake, but also tends to obscure its relationship to the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Tung-Hui Hu, A Prehistory of the Cloud (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2015) at x.
Ibid.
Dzieza, supra note 67.
Hu, supra note 92 at ix.
Ibid at xii.
Ibid at xvi, 4.
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human beings who collect, manage, and exploit it. As Deborah Lupton explains,
these words “suggest an economy of digital data and surveillance in which data
are collected constantly and move from site to site in ways that cannot easily
themselves be monitored, measured or regulated.”102
A close link is the image of data as a resource to be extracted from the
natural world and transformed, exploited, and monetized.103 It is what Cornelius
Puschmann and Jean Burgess describe as the “nourishment/fuel to be consumed”
metaphor of big data.104 These industrial analogies, like data ‘mining,’ ‘refining,’
and ‘raw data’—along with declarations in the popular press announcing
that “data is the new oil”105—suggest the need for large-scale processing.106
More troublingly, they divorce data from the very human beings from which
it originates, transforming its analysis into a commercial activity that can be
“obscured, specialized, and distanced” from public scrutiny.107 Following the
Snowden revelations, these same patterns were mirrored in words used to describe
government surveillance, signaling the exploitation of a natural resource (sweep,
harvest, gather, scoop, glean, pluck, trap) and evoking the language of industry
(mine, dig, burrow).108 Nautical themes (dragnet, trawling, tentacles, harbour,
net, inundated, leviathan) and biological and medical elements (hemorrhaging,
implanting, infect, ingest, inject, stethoscopic) also featured prominently
when public discourse around surveillance was analyzed.109 Yet in the face of
the enormous privacy and civil liberties implications of big data analytics, the
natural resource metaphor in particular has become a lightning rod for criticism.
As Hwang and Levy have written:
Just as the history of resource exploitation in America—from westward expansion
through the Gold Rush, and beyond into modern-day debates about water and
102. Deborah Lupton, “Swimming or drowning in the data ocean? Thoughts
on the metaphors of big data” (29 October 2013), This Sociological
Life (blog), online: <simplysociology.wordpress.com/2013/10/29/
swimming-or-drowning-in-the-data-ocean-thoughts-on-the-metaphors-of-big-data>.
103. Puschmann & Burgess, supra note 55 at 1698.
104. Ibid at 1700.
105. Watson, supra note 59.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Deji Bryce Olukotun, “Sweep, Harvest, Gather: Mapping Metaphors to Fight Surveillance,”
The Millions (10 April 2014), online: <themillions.com/2014/04/sweep-harvest-gathermapping-metaphors-to-fight-surveillance.html>.
109. Julia Fleischaker, “Mapping the language we use to describe surveillance,”
Melville House (11 April 2014), online: <www.mhpbooks.com/
mapping-the-language-we-use-to-describe-surveillance>.
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air rights—involves the appropriation of resources that belonged to someone else,
online data collection policy treats personal information as a natural, inexhaustible
good—ripe for exploitation in the name of economic growth and private gain.110

Jer Thorpe goes even further to subvert this narrative by extending it to its
logical outgrowths: “where oil is composed of the compressed bodies of long-dead
micro-organisms, this personal data is made from the compressed fragments of our
personal lives. It is a dense condensate of our human experience.”111 By contrast,
in a 2015 talk Maciej Ceglowski aimed to invert the metaphor entirely, asking
listeners to “imagine data not as a pristine resource, but as a waste product,
a bunch of radioactive, toxic sludge that we don’t know how to handle.”112
The examples above touch all dimensions of the law—from the philosophy of
jurisdiction, to contract and intellectual property, to deep constitutional problems
of privacy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. They are presented here
not merely to act as a survey of existing literature, but instead to demonstrate the
force with which metaphor shapes the social, political, and legal rules assigned
to particular technologies. And, while the power of metaphor to distort reality
should not be overlooked, we should also avoid discounting its functional utility.
As Vee explains, “whatever their function in legal discourse, metaphors can
illuminate the unstable identities for technologies when they are new—before
their uses become well-worn grooves through culture and communication.”113
And it is clear that the law’s approach to cryptographic tools is in need of such
illumination on multiple fronts. As Jeffrey Kiok explains, “there is no historical
analogue that matches encryption in the constitutionally relevant ways,” and the
appropriate legal metaphors remain unfixed.114
We must exercise caution, however, because once folded into the law,
what Larsson calls the “conceptual path dependence” of a metaphor becomes
jurisprudentially entrenched and difficult to escape.115 When new technologies
inherit old legal metaphors, they also inherit old rules, models, and limitations.
This becomes problematic where the new technology is used in or behaves in
110. Hwang & Levy, supra note 65.
111. Jer Thorpe, “Big Data Is Not the New Oil” Harvard Business Review (30 November 2012),
online: <hbr.org/2012/11/data-humans-and-the-new-oil>.
112. Maciej Cegłowski, “Haunted by Data” (Lecture delivered at the Strata + Hadoop
World Conference, New York City, 1 October 2015), online: <idlewords.com/talks/
haunted_by_data.htm>.
113. Vee, supra note 27 at 1.
114. Jeffrey Kiok, “Missing the Metaphor: Compulsory Decryption and the Fifth Amendment”
(2015) 24:1 BU PILJ 53 at 76.
115. Larsson, “Pirate Bay,” supra note 63 at 376.
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ways which could not have been anticipated by looking to that which came
before. This failure to conform to the paradigm set out by the old metaphorical
infrastructure can lead to a break down in the logic of the law, which Sawhney,
Suri, and Lee have called “a metaphor vacuum.”116 As will be discussed in Part V
below, the legal treatment of encryption technology is characterized by precisely
this kind of problem.

V. THE ENCRYPTED MACHINE
As discussed in Part II, modern encryption raises both practical and
theoretical problems in areas such as criminal evidence, national security, and
constitutional law.117 They range from fairly straightforward procedural issues
to larger philosophical questions about the appropriate limits of state power.
In practice of course, these questions are deeply interrelated and hard to untangle
from one another.
This Part explores some of the possible metaphors which have historically been
advanced to describe the process or result of encryption, but begins by offering
a few thoughts on methodology. When attempting to unpack the normative
implications of a given metaphor, we need to look carefully at the mechanics of
its implicit arguments. How, for example, does it explain, ignore, or transform
the specific component parts of the technology? If one says that “encryption is a
cat,” what parts of the cat make up the plaintext, the ciphertext, the key, and the
act of production or technological mechanism from which that key is derived?
As Vee has recognized in her study of metaphors for code, it is also essential to
recognize that the law rarely settles on a singular analogy for all cases—rather,
it develops various cognitive models for a given technological concept depending
on its legal and factual context.118 That choice will be shaped by the political and
legal debate in which it is embedded. For example, as discussed in Part II, one
of the earliest legal treatments of encryption took place in the context of arms
regulation—with the underlying assumption that if encryption was a kind of
weapon, it ought to be controlled as one. Later, restrictions on the distribution of
cryptographic algorithms were challenged by the argument that code (including
cryptographic code) had an expressive dimension which made it more like a kind
of speech—protecting cryptographer Daniel Bernstein’s “right to circulate his
116. Sawhney, Suri & Lee, supra note 71.
117. Though it also likely has a number of private law implications far beyond the scope
of this article.
118. Vee, supra note 27.
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algorithm as freely as he might ‘speak’ it.”119 Yet while they may have latent power
and utility, neither of these two metaphors will necessarily translate perfectly
to contexts beyond the debate over export controls for cryptographic products.
Indeed, different fact scenarios and uses for encryption may require different
metaphors entirely. For example, A. Michael Froomkin (one of the earliest writers
to explore cryptographic metaphor) described four possible modes of imagining
the component parts of encrypted communication—as a car, language, house,
or safe.120 Whether or not they are ultimately desirable and accurate rhetorical
tools, it is possible to see how the first two may be more appropriately applied
to describe the process of encryption in transit between two parties, whereas
the latter two seem best positioned to describe the data at rest. Similarly, the
appropriate metaphor may differ depending on the specific technical tool in
question. For example, email encrypted using PGP is often distinguished from
unencrypted email by comparing postcards to sealed envelopes—an idea which
builds analogy on the back of existing “skeumorphic” conceptions of email as
postal mail. While this metaphor may have some utility in describing a single
encrypted email (though problematically, it continues to replicate the ‘container’
problem discussed below) it is far less appropriate to explain the nature of a hard
drive with full-disk encryption, or the concept of encrypted network traffic.121
Finally, the choice will also depend on motive. Hypothetically, law enforcement
concerned about accessibility of evidence may be more concerned with cultivating
metaphors that describe the paradigmatic model of an encrypted machine at rest,
whereas intelligence agencies engaged in large-scale network surveillance may be
inclined toward thinking about the data in transit.
In the words of Charlotte Linde, “people in power get to impose their
metaphors,” so we ought to look carefully at what metaphors those people
choose.122 The analogy most frequently advanced by law enforcement to describe
the encrypted machine has been the idea of the device as a locked ‘container,’
which takes various forms depending on context. Former Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey has likely been the most persistent
advocate of this metaphor, for example using the analogy of un-openable
“car trunks” and “apartments” in reaction to Apple and Google’s decision to
119. Ibid at 3 referring to Bernstein, supra note 27.
120. A Michael Froomkin, “The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the
Constitution” (1995) 143:3 U Pa L Rev 709 at 861.
121. See Paul Ohm, “The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance” 2009:5 U Ill L
Rev 1417 at 1453.
122. Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 54 at 157.
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introduce mobile device encryption by default.123 Comey’s cognitive model
for the encrypted machine hinges on the idea of devices like computers and
mobile phones as enclosed physical spaces—as houses, closets, and vehicles full
of evidence robbed from the hands of law enforcement.124 Here we see certain
parallels to the discussion of ‘cyberspace’ above, as well as to Josephine Wolff’s
study of the language used in computer security, in which she describes burglary
as one of three core metaphors of the field.125 She writes that
[c]omparisons of Internet crime to burglary draw on this notion of breaking into
a protected space and apply it to a domain in which both the ideas of “breaking”
and “entering” have a much less physical manifestation … Many descriptions and
explanations of how computer networks should be defended derive from these
analogies to protecting houses against burglars and fortifying medieval castles. In
many ways however, the burglar metaphor fails to provide meaningful guidance …
[as] some of its central assumptions about the nature of theft and the best ways to
stop burglars do not map neatly from castles onto computers.126

Yet this metaphorical deficit has not stopped the language of an encrypted
device as box, room, or home from dominating either the public encryption
debate or the courtroom rhetoric of law enforcement. In one of the hearings
over the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone, Comey even proclaimed that the FBI
was simply “asking Apple to take the vicious guard dog away and let us pick the
lock.”127 At the same time, the narrative has been subversively adopted by critics
of the policies which the ‘container’ metaphor otherwise tends to support. For
example, the non-governmental organization Article 19 has described encryption
backdoors as the equivalent of “requiring locksmiths to produce weak door locks
123. Kashmir Hill, “FBI Director says Apple and Google are Putting their Customers ‘Beyond the
Law,’” Forbes (13 October 2014), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/13/
fbi-director-says-apple-and-google-are- putting-their-customers-beyond-the-law>.
124. James B Comey, “Expectations of Privacy: Balancing Liberty, Security, and Public
Safety” (Address delivered at the Center for the Study of American Democracy Biennial
Conference, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, 6 April 2016), online: www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/expectations-of-privacy-balancing-liberty-security-and-public-safety [Comey,
“Expectations of Privacy”].
125. Josephine Wolff, “Cybersecurity as Metaphor: Policy and Defense Implications of Computer
Security Metaphors” (Paper delivered at the TPRC Research Conference on Communication,
Information, and Internet Policy, American University, Washington College of Law,
31 March 2014) at 6, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418638>.
126. Ibid.
127. Spencer Ackerman, Sam Thelma & Danny Yadron, “Congress tells FBI
that forcing Apple to unlock iPhones is ‘a fool’s errand,’” The Guardian (1
March 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/01/
apple-fbi-congress-hearing-iphone-encryption-san-bernardino>.
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and deadbolts in order to facilitate governments’ access to private homes,” and a
coalition of cryptographers has employed the analogy of “keys under doormats.”128
Of course, ‘backdoor’ is itself a metaphor.
At the heart of Comey’s analogy—one which has been adopted by courts
and commentators alike—is the aspiration that digital and physical evidence be
treated identically by the law, even where they exhibit fundamentally different
characteristics.129 As others have explained however, the container metaphor fails
to represent the technical process of encrypting data. This is because, as explained
in Part II, encryption does not create a ‘barrier’ between the outside world and
the plaintext. There is no intelligible data hidden ‘inside’ an encrypted file or
machine—rather, encryption renders data unintelligible, transformed, and
rearranged by a mathematical process.130 There can be no plaintext version of
the data somehow enclosed within, because (to quote Gertrude Stein) there’s no
“there” there at all.
But it would be unfair to attribute this misunderstanding entirely to Comey.
While the FBI’s use is certainly opportunistic, the idea of ‘containers’ is at the
heart of many so-called skeumorphs we use to understand our devices (encrypted
and otherwise) on a day-to-day basis. As Kiok explains:
The kind of language people use when talking about computers (e.g., files and
folders) and the language that encryption companies often use to describe what their
products “do” (e.g., creating encrypted “containers,” encrypting a “file” or “folder,”
or using a “key” to “unlock” encrypted media) can cause people to improperly
analogize how encryption software actually works.131

In this light, it is unsurprising that the cognitive model has a certain
commonsensical resonance with judges and politicians. Nevertheless, metaphors
in law and policy can be intentionally weaponized toward a specific legal purpose or
vision, revealing both the “design intentions,” as well as “the political assumptions
and aspirations” of those who use them.132 In this instance, the concept of
device-as-container functionally serves to weaken the self-incrimination argument
against compelled decryption, and perhaps to challenge certain conceptions of
privacy more generally. It serves two dual functions: it obfuscates the testimonial
128. Article 19, supra note 32 at 30; Harold Abelson et al, “Keys Under Doormats: Mandating
Insecurity by Requiring Government Access to All Data and Communications” (2015),
online: <www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL.pdf>.
129. See Comey, “Expectations of Privacy,” supra note 124.
130. Kiok, supra note 114 at 54.
131. Ibid at 58.
132. Wyatt, supra note 57 at 244-45.
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aspect of disclosing a private key, and it rejects the notion that there is any
qualitative difference in the kind or scope of information stored on digital devices
compared to what might otherwise be physically stored or discovered.
The images selected to substantiate the FBI’s metaphor of enclosure (car,
apartment, box) are not accidental: after all, Fifth Amendment protection is
meant to extend only to “expression of the contents of an individual’s mind,” not
to the contents of their glove compartment.133 It is essential to recall that various
courts, including the US Supreme Court, have determined that surrendering
the key to a strongbox fails to engage one’s rights against self-incrimination
because it is “non-testimonial,” whereas providing the combination to a locked
safe (a “product of the mind”) engages those rights. So, the logic follows, the
more a computer is “like” a lockbox (and consequently the more a private key is
“like” a physical key), the easier it will be for the state to compel an individual to
decrypt a device.134 And, while the courts in the United States may have largely
accepted the argument that the disclosure of a password is a testimonial act, the
metaphor of locked containers arguably remains the dominant narrative in public
and political discourse. The narrative is emblematic of a larger worldview which
struggles to tolerate the idea of space beyond the law’s reach, captured by Comey’s
declaration that there is in fact “no such thing as absolute privacy in America.
There is no place outside the reach of judicial authority.”135
Even the ‘combination safe’ analogy is only an improvement insofar as it helps
to capture the testimonial nature of an alphanumeric password or passphrase,
“because a combination is something that is in one’s mind.”136 It fails, as does
the locked container analogy, to say much about whether the data we keep in
combination safes (or cars or closets or boxes) is qualitatively different in any
way from the kinds of things one might keep on their mobile phone or laptop.
Moreover, it continues to mislead its audience in suggesting that a plaintext
version continues to exist somewhere ‘within’ the ‘safe,’ replicating the same
technical inaccuracies as described above.137 The biggest problem with the safe
133. Doe v United States, 487 US 201 at 210 (1988) [Doe]. See also James Comey, “Even
Our Memories Are Not Absolutely Private in America” (Address delivered at the Boston
Conference on Cyber Security, Boston, 8 March 2017), online: <www.c-span.org/
video/?c4662211/even-memories-absolutely-private-america-james-comey-head-fbi>. Comey
is quick to point out that “even our memories are not absolutely private” in the case of
immunity orders where testimony is compelled in the same speech (ibid).
134. Kiok, supra note 114 at 77; Thomson & Jaikaran, supra note 36 at 9.
135. Comey, “Expectations of Privacy,” supra note 124.
136. Kiok, supra note 114 at 77.
137. Ibid.
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metaphor, however, is that it maintains a “conceptual path dependence”138 which
remains fixated on the nature of the ‘testimony’—i.e., the act of key production,
or the mechanism from which the private key is derived. That fixation serves
to potentially exclude deeper questions—from the purpose of constitutional
protection against self-incrimination to the scope of state power, the limits of the
right to privacy, and the concept of individual liberty.
Indeed, by taking a step back, this distinction between ‘testimony’ and
‘non-testimony’ can seem arbitrary from the perspective of an outsider. For
example, a 2014 decision by a Virginia court found that forcing a man to
unlock a cell phone using his fingerprint failed to engage his right against
self-incrimination, as the fingerprint itself was deemed ‘non-testimonial.’139
In Doe, the court reviewed case law affirming that “to furnish a blood sample;
to provide a handwriting exemplar, or a voice exemplar; to stand in a lineup; and to
wear particular clothing” had all been found to be non-testimonial.140 The image
of an individual’s face, which mobile phone companies have been experimenting
with as a mechanism to unlock a mobile device, appears to be similarly
non-testimonial—as are likely to be all other forms of biometric identification,
including retinal scans.141 Gestures and pattern locks, by contrast (because they
are stored only within the defendant’s mind) have been declared as ‘testimonial’
as an alphanumeric password,142 despite being potentially less secure for general
use.143 It must also be recalled that regardless of whether a device is secured using
an alphanumeric password, a passphrase, a fingerprint, a gesture, or even a facial
scan as the mechanism from which the key is derived, encrypting the device
involves precisely the same kind of mathematical transformation in all cases. The
ciphertext is just as computationally difficult to decrypt in the key’s absence, and
the user presumably expects that her data is equally secure and equally private.144
This process of categorization implicitly accepts that the correct way to determine
whether an accused’s right against self-incrimination should apply—potentially a
138.
139.
140.
141.

Larsson, “Pirate Bay,” supra note 63 at 376.
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Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, “Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of
Self-Incrimination in the Digital Era” (2012) 15 J Const L 11 at 20-24.
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the protection against unreasonable search and seizure and arguments related to
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determining factor in their imprisonment or worse—is whether a metaphorical
abstraction of a technical process (the mechanism from which the key is derived)
is sufficiently similar to the separate metaphorical abstraction of forced speech
(testimony). Ultimately, this is not likely to be the right approach.
Perhaps most troubling of all, the courts’ reliance on the distinction between
‘testimony’ and ‘non-testimony’ has the effect of putting the constitutional
liberties of those who use encryption software at the mercy of opaque commercial
interests and in the hands of those who make design decisions about consumer
electronics. It is not hyperbolic to say that a decision by a major company like
Google, Apple, Facebook, or Microsoft to move away from passphrase-based
keys and toward biometric ones could fundamentally erase the protection against
compelled decryption under the Fifth Amendment for large numbers of people.145
Vivek Mohan and John Villasenor also raise the problem that digital analysis of
non-testimonial biometric measures such as “eye movement, position, and gaze
(as well as heart rate, respiration, and facial expression)” may increasingly be used
to infer information about a ‘testimonial’ passphrase, lessening the computational
burden of conducting a brute force attack and rendering the protection for
‘testimonial’ keys mostly worthless.146 While perhaps judicially expedient, and
while the distinction between what is and is not ‘testimonial’ conforms tightly
to the internal logic of the law, it fails to present a particularly principled or
coherent approach to the issue of self-incrimination.
Instead, it may be worthwhile to reexamine earlier metaphors encryption
as an act of ‘speech’ or a kind of ‘language.’147 Recall that in early cases such
as Bernstein, US courts accepted the argument that cryptographic source code
was expression protected under the First Amendment.148 Since that time, there
have been various instances where parties or interveners sought to emphasize the
expressive and speech-like aspects of the act of production (e.g., the passphrase) in
order to emphasize its ‘testimonial’ nature. At the same time, speech metaphors
have also crept into descriptions that give the process of encrypting an expressive
dimension, as well as into descriptions of the ciphertext itself as a kind of expressive
work. This idea was captured by Shari Steele and Danny Whitener in 1996 when
they wrote that “prohibiting the use of a particular form of cryptography for
145. For a broad discussion of biometric access codes entering the market, see e.g. Alex Hern,
“Google aims to kill passwords by the end of this year,” The Guardian (24 May 2016), online:
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/24/google-passwords-android>.
146. Mohan & Villasenor, supra note 141 at 26-27.
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the express purpose of making communication intelligible to law enforcement
officers is akin to prohibiting someone from speaking a language not understood
by law enforcement officers.”149 Others have experimented with framing the
right to use encryption as “a right to be able to limit to whom one imparts
one’s ideas,” captured metaphorically as a “right to whisper.”150 In an amicus brief
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) in the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Leon
Gelfgatt, the interveners argued that an order compelling an individual to decrypt
a file is akin to an order to explain, transform, or translate it.151 They argued
that an individual could not be asked by the court to turn information that is
incomprehensible into information that could put him or her in prison without
running directly counter to the essential core of Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination. The analogy they chose is novel:
Being compelled to decrypt a computer drive is like being forced to create, for the
benefit of someone standing on the steps of the Boston Public Library, an English
translation of every single literary book written in Braille. Doing so would not
simply communicate the translator’s access to and ability to translate the Braille
works, though it would do that. It would also create new versions of those works:
English translations revealing the number, length, and contents of all the books in
the library’s Braille collection.152

Kiok rejects the ‘language’ or ‘translation’ metaphor on the basis that
“generally, more than one person knows a language … [I]f a person can read
Spanish, the Government cannot prove that that person knows the contents of
every Spanish-language text.”153 However, he acknowledges the conceptual value
in the argument that “the fact that only an individual defendant can ‘speak’
the ‘language’ of encryption has testimonial significance, because it allows the
Government to prove sole control of the encrypted media.”154 Recall that the
process of disclosing that which decrypts a device can (depending on how one
149. Shari Steele & Daniel J Weitzner, “Chipping Away at Privacy,” (16 April 1993) online:
Electronic Frontier Foundation <w2.eff.org/Privacy/Key_escrow/Clipper/clipper.summary>.
See also Kehl, Wilson & Bankston, supra note 21 at 14.
150. LEAP Encryption Access Project, “The Right to Whisper,” online: <leap.se/en/
about-us/vision>.
151. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Leon Gelfgatt, 11 NE (3d) 605 (Mass 2014) (Brief for
Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts, the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the Electronic Frontier Foundation in
support of the Defendant-Appellee, 2013 WL 6002864).
152. Ibid at 4.
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154. Ibid at 76.
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looks at it) communicate self-incriminating information on at least two levels:
first through the disclosure of potentially incriminating communications data
stored on a device (such as files, images, or messages), and second because there
is evidentiary value in the demonstration that one is able to decrypt a particular
device in the first place (to extend the metaphor, to show that one knows how to
translate the book, or that one speaks the right language to do so).155
Speech and translation metaphors help to solidify the testimonial dimension
of disclosure. And, in terms of comparison to the container metaphors described
earlier, the idea of translating an undecipherable book is also much closer to the
actual mathematical process involved in decryption; rather than alluding to some
hidden plaintext version, it makes the idea of transformation more salient and
obvious. It is also possible that describing the abstract process of decryption as
translation could ultimately represent a subtle cognitive shift that lessens the focus
on the specific nature of key and allow us to imagine instead what has happened
to the data itself. The idea that the ciphertext has some expressive value in its
own right is also potentially useful, at least in the ongoing debate surrounding
government-imposed backdoors (though not necessarily to the self-incrimination
tests set out by the Fifth Amendment or Canadian Charter jurisprudence as they
stand today). Nevertheless, because the ease of decrypting a device (if one knows
what protects the private key) roughly approximates the ease of opening a locked
container (rather than the difficulty of translating a library of Braille) courts may
find this distinction less compelling than technical experts do.156
Others have attempted to capture the process of transformation that
encrypted data undergoes by using the ‘shredder’ metaphor. Whereas in the
‘container’ analogies the type of key derivation mechanism seems to matter most,
and in the ‘translation’ metaphor the process of encryption and decryption seems
most important, the ‘shredder’ metaphor creates a vivid mental image of the
ciphertext itself. In this model, the metaphorically shredded documents are in the
hands of the state, but cannot be reassembled or understood without the specific
assistance and knowledge of the accused.157 The Electronic Frontier Foundation
has made a closely related argument, describing the ciphertext both as “confetti

155. Ibid.
156. There is a link here to the “substantial cognitive content” argument. See Thomson &
Jaikaran, supra note 36 at 13.
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made from a shredded document” and “like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.”158
Again, this model is an improvement on the container analogy insofar as it
negates the false impression that encryption creates an enclosed space:
An encrypted drive is similar to a massively (if not impossibly) complex jigsaw
puzzle, with billions of individual pieces and no clues about how to assemble them.
There is no barrier that prevents a person from opening the box and inspecting the
pieces inside, but that inspection does not reveal what the assembled puzzle would
depict. While trial and error would theoretically enable solving such a puzzle, in
practice its immense complexity would mean that only a person who already knows
what the final image is supposed to look like, or who has numbered the pieces and
remembers their correct ordering, could put the pieces together and complete the
puzzle.159

This is likely the most accurate metaphorical representation of encryption as
a mathematical process, and, like the idea of ‘translation,’ emphasizes the coercive
dimension at play. At the same time, this analogy does not entirely address the
present legal preoccupation with the testamentary value of the mechanism used
to decrypt the ciphertext. It continues to function for passphrases and numeric
combinations, but it is unclear whether the ‘puzzle’ analogy would afford any
greater protection in the case of devices using traditionally ‘non-testimonial’
mechanisms such as a fingerprint.
Finally, all of these metaphors potentially fail to appreciate the intimacy and
particular nature of the information at stake in our personal devices. If at the
core of the common law constitutional protection against self-incrimination is
the belief that the contents of one’s mind should be protected from government
reach unless disclosed voluntarily, then it may be worth taking a closer look at
the nature of the plaintext itself. Notably, the American case law has failed to find
that the contents of an encrypted device are protected by the Fifth Amendment,
hence the emphasis on the testimonial act which discloses the key.160 However,
as the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged when describing the heightened
expectation of privacy associated with personal computers in R v Vu, these devices
simply cannot be imagined as “containers” like cabinets or cupboards. Rather
they “give police access to vast amounts of information that users cannot control,
that they may not even be aware of or may have chosen to discard and which
158. United States v Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F(3d) 238 (3d Cir 2017) (Brief of Amici
Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and American Civil Liberties Union in support of
Appellant, 2016 WL 1529869 at 6) [Apple Mac Pro Computer Amicus Brief in Support of
the Appellant].
159. Ibid at 8.
160. Thomson & Jaikaran, supra note 36 at 7.
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may not be, in any meaningful sense, located in the place of the search.”161 The
EFF and ACLU have similarly explained that “our computers, phones, and other
electronic devices contain a catalogue of information as diverse as the thoughts in
our mind.”162 Indeed, this idea goes back as far as the 1940s, to Vannevar Bush’s
now-classic essay entitled “As We May Think.”163 In that piece, Bush proposed
a device he named the memex, a kind of mechanical file library that allowed the
user to catalogue and link together all of his or her records, private thoughts, and
communications. Despite the fact that the memex is comparatively crude when
held against modern computers or mobile devices, he did not hesitate to imagine
the machine’s relationship to its user as “an enlarged intimate supplement to
his memory.”164 Potentially, by reconfiguring the encryption equation in a way
that places contextual emphasis on the plaintext, we are able to better emphasize
our relationship to the devices and their role in our lives better. This perspective
highlights the intimate practical and philosophical relationship between
self-incrimination and privacy rights where digital evidence is concerned. In this
final model—‘machine as externalized memory’—precise legal categories are
backgrounded and the constitutional stakes are allowed to take center stage.
As a final aside, while the idea of an encrypted machine as ‘container’
determines what the metaphorical key is to the law, it also has implications for
the evolution of the “foregone conclusion” doctrine in the United States, which
allows governments to compel decryption where key disclosure fails to add to
the sum of information already known to government.165 Some federal circuit
courts have introduced limitations to this doctrine through the “reasonable
particularity” standard, which requires the state to have specific knowledge of
particular files on a given machine, rather than allow decryption on a broader or
more generalized basis.166 Dan Terzian—himself an advocate of the less restrictive
approach to compelled decryption—applies the container analogy to describe the
issue as follows:
But for other courts, knowing that the unencrypted version exists isn’t enough.
Instead the government must also know particular files exist on that version. This
method silently shifts the inquiry; facing the government’s demand for a car (the
unencrypted hard drive), these courts required knowledge of what’s in the glove
161. R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 at para 24, [2013] 3 SCR 657 [Vu].
162. Apple Mac Pro Computer Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellant, supra note 158 at 3.
163. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic (July 1945), online: <www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881>.
164. Apple Mac Pro Computer Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellant, supra note 158 at 3.
165. Thomson & Jaikaran, supra note 36 at 8.
166. Mohan & Villasenor, supra note 141 at 20-21.
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compartment (particular files). The shift is subtle, but the effect profound. Courts
requiring only knowledge that the unencrypted version exists will always find a
foregone conclusion, whereas courts requiring knowledge of the particular files
usually won’t.167

Metaphor connected to the spatiality, location, and storage of data also
raises issues for the reasonable particularity standard—issues which are in many
ways similar to those applied to ‘big data’ or ‘cloud’ metaphors described in Part
IV. “It is quite possible for the government to show knowledge of existence,
possession, and authenticity without specifying the technologically problematic
‘location’ of such information,” Kiok explains, arguing that to require this latter
element creates unnecessary confusion.168

VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Metaphor is not a mere descriptive tool: it is a persuasive device fraught with
the possibility to distort, manipulate, or obfuscate reality. Courts and legislators
must therefore take a disciplined approach to understanding technical concepts
in order to ensure that they are awake to the political and legal implications of
their legal choices. In this light, many scholars have argued for the abandonment
of technological metaphor altogether. For example, Kiok has said specifically in
the context of encryption and the Fifth Amendment that
courts and commentators should be hesitant to analogize encryption to older
technology, and instead should engage in a fact-specific inquiry that focuses on
exactly what type of encryption is being used, the testimonial nature of the act
of production of a password or decrypted material, and what the government can
prove it already knows about the material it is seeking. Inapt analogies and inexact
information yield “bad” law. Prosecutors and defense counsel should ensure that
experts who understand the issues of encryption testify to a judge in a cogent and
coherent way that puts the testimonial issue squarely before a court.169

Yet divorcing ourselves from metaphor in the law entirely is both an
impractical and a philosophically tenuous proposal. First, it ignores the practical
benefit of metaphor, both in its ability to “operationaliz[e] legal theories”
effectively and in its capacity translate complex technological problems into
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legally meaningful language.170 In Fuller’s words, “[i]t is easy to say, ‘Fictions are
makeshifts, crutches to which science ought not to resort.’ So soon as science can
get along without them, certainly not! But it is better that science should go on
crutches than to slip without them, or not to venture to move at all.”171
Perhaps more importantly, we miss the point that imagining legal reasoning
in the absence of technical metaphor implicitly assumes that there remains some
fixed, inherent logic to the legal rules and categories at all. In reality, those categories
(whether ‘testimony,’ or ‘personhood’) are generally themselves abstractions,
with boundaries that shift over time and place, embedded with metaphor all
the way down. We must therefore remain skeptical about the extent to which
it is possible for jurists and judges to “achieve a ‘metaphor-free’ understanding
of the technology.”172 Instead, courts and policymakers ought to strive first to
understand the technical, mathematical, or scientific concepts at play as scientists
themselves do—in full recognition that “scientific” thinking has its own problems
of metaphor and category—and take a critical stance when examining the fictions
we then use to translate those concepts into law. Expert testimony is one element
of that process, as is a commitment to nuanced, fact-specific reasoning and more
rigorous professional development of technological literacy among jurists.
There is no doubt that metaphor will continue to shape the way the
law understands encryption, and those understandings in turn may have
a transformative impact on our substantive legal and political rights. This
power is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the fields of criminal evidence
and constitutional law, but may have broader implications in the long view
of technology law as both a discipline and tradition. We must work to “see
through” these metaphors, appreciating those instances where they illuminate,
while recognizing when they may mislead. For as long as encryption offers the
promise of carving out “a space free of power’s reach,” jurists have an obligation
to find metaphors big enough to speak to that greater truth.173 This demands a
serious engagement with both text and meaning: a critical, transparent, and lucid
appreciation of language and the power it wields.
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